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'Openness' and the 'Market Friendly' Approach to Development: 
Learning the Right Lessons from Development Experience 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Two principal analytical and practical policy issues in economic 
development today are: 
 
 a) the degree and kind of openness to the world economy a 
developing country should seek; 
 
 b) what should the government do, or not do, in order to  
promote fast economic and industrial development. 
 
These questions are controversial and have therefore been the 
subject of an important debate, not least in the pages of this 
Journal.  In view of its direct policy involvement in developing 
countries around the globe, the World Bank has been a major 
participant in this debate.  In a large number of studies and 
reports,
i
 World Bank economists have provided detailed analyses 
of these questions. Specifically, they have argued that the best 
way to achieve economic growth for developing countries is to be 
highly open to the world economy and to seek a close integration 
with it.  On the second issue, they have suggested a relatively 
limited role for the state, encapsulated in the concept of a 
 
 
 2 
'market-friendly' approach to development. 
 
The importance of the World Bank analyses and conclusions on these 
subjects for economic policy hardly needs any emphasis. However, 
these analyses are also significant for another reason: since the 
beginning of this decade, Bank economists have departed 
significantly from the extreme free market neoclassical 
perspectives which often characterised their contributions in the 
1980s. In that sense, the Bank's views on these questions today 
probably represent the professional mainstream.  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to carry forward the recent 
debate
ii
 between the World Bank and the heterodox or  
'revisionist' economists, which centres around the analysis of 
the development experience of the economically highly successful 
East Asian countries. It will be suggested here that this debate 
has already made considerable progress and has led to a degree 
of convergence between the two schools on a range of analytical 
and empirical issues, though, as will soon become evident below, 
not yet on policy. This paper aims to carry this process further 
by identifying and commenting on the most important issues which 
still remain in contention. 
 
The paper will, inter alia, outline an alternative framework for 
examining the question of openness, which leads to a rather 
different policy conclusion than that above. It will be argued 
here that, in contrast to the recommendations of the  
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Bretton Wood institutions,  developing countries should actively 
seek  'strategic' rather than  'close' integration with the 
international economy.  Further, the paper will suggest that 
government needs to have a far bigger role in economic activity 
than is envisaged in the 'market-friendly' approach.  It is 
contended that in mixed economy countries with reasonably 
effective states, the government should pursue a dynamic 
industrial policy to bring about the desired structural 
transformations in the economy as speedily as possible, to achieve 
fast economic growth. These, it is argued, are the correct lessons 
to be learnt from the East Asian economic record.  
 
Taking into account previous contributions to the debate, the paper 
concentrates on the following specific issues: 
(a) the question of the effectiveness of industrial policy; (b) 
the issue of 'openness'; (c) the nature of competition in domestic 
markets and (d) the relationship between technology policy, 
industrial policy and international competitiveness. Particular 
attention will be paid here to the theoretical underpinnings of 
the World Bank analyses of these issues. Specifically, the neglect 
of the role of 'demand' in such analyses will be highlighted. This, 
it will be shown, leads to incorrect interpretations of the East 
Asian development record at key stages of the Bank's argument. 
For space reasons, and also to sharpen the debate, the empirical 
analysis will be confined here to Japan and South Korea - two of 
the most important exemplar countries. It will be shown that a 
proper consideration of the role of the balance of payments 
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constraint and of demand leads to a rather different interpretation 
of the experience of these economies from that provided by World 
Bank economists. 
   
2. THE MARKET-FRIENDLY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT: THE BANK'S THESIS 
 
The concept of the 'market friendly' strategy of development was 
put forward in the World Bank's seminal 1991 Report: The Challenge 
of Development. [World Bank,(1991), hereafter referred to as the 
1991 Report]. Representing the synthesis of what the World Bank 
economists have learnt from forty years of development experience, 
the starting point for the 1991 Report was the question:  why 
during the last four decades some developing countries were 
successful in the sense of substantially raising their per capita 
incomes whilst others were not?  The central analytical argument 
is that economic growth is determined essentially by the growth 
of total factor productivity (TFP) of capital and labour.  The 
Report's analysis came to the conclusion that the more open an 
economy, the greater the degree of competition and the higher its 
investment in education, the greater would be its growth of TFP 
and hence its overall economic growth.  Although the significance 
of international economic factors was recognised, a major argument 
of the Report was that domestic policy matters far more for raising 
per capita incomes than world economic conditions. 
 
With respect to economic policy, the Report concluded that:  
"Economic theory and practical experience suggest that 
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(government) interventions are likely to help provided they are 
market-friendly" (p. 5).  In order for `market-friendly' not to 
be a mere tautology, the Report, to its credit, defined the concept 
fairly precisely in the following terms: 
 a.  Intervene reluctantly.  Let markets work unless it is 
demonstrably better to step in...  [It] is usually a mistake 
for the state to carry out physical production, or to protect 
the domestic production of a good that can be imported more 
cheaply and whose local production offers few spillover 
benefits. 
 b.  Apply checks and balances.  Put interventions 
continually to the discipline of international and domestic 
markets. 
 c.  Intervene openly.  Make interventions simple, 
transparent and subject to rules rather than official 
discretion. 
 
Overall, the state's role in economic development in this 
'market-friendly' approach is regarded as being important but best 
limited to providing the social, legal and economic 
infrastructure, to creating a suitable climate for private 
enterprise, but also, significantly, to ensure a high level and 
appropriate composition of human capital formation. Even this 
limited role for the state is, nevertheless, an advance over the 
earlier neoclassical thinking which enjoined governments simply 
to avoid distortions, provide a stable macroeconomic environment 
and a reliable legal framework. 
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Both the neoclassical and the 'market friendly' analyses have 
encountered serious intellectual difficulties since neither can 
satisfactorily explain the outstanding success of East Asian 
economies. Revisionist authors, such as Boltho(1985a), 
Amsden(1989) and Wade(1990) have pointed out that in countries 
like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the government has played a 
leading and a heavily interventionist role in the course of their 
economic development.  
 
This intellectual challenge was taken up by World Bank (1993), 
the East Asia Miracle study (hereafter referred to as the Miracle 
Study), which has produced a new analysis of the economic 
development of the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) 
including Japan. This study fully acknowledges the facts of 
enormous government economic interventions in most spheres in 
these countries, much as documented by the revisionist school. 
 
 
However, the Study goes on to suggest that such interventions, 
particularly in the sphere of industrial policy, had in general 
a limited effect. Some of these worked for some of the time in 
a few countries, but overall they were neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the extraordinary success of these countries. Thus, 
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the Study:  
"What are the main factors that contributed to the HPAE's superior 
allocation of physical and human capital to high 
yielding investments and their ability to catch up 
technologically? Mainly, the answer lies in 
fundamentally sound, market oriented policies. Labour 
markets were allowed to work. Financial markets ... 
generally had low distortions and limited subsidies 
compared with other developing economies. Import 
substitution was ... quickly accompanied by the 
promotion of exports. ... the result was limited 
differences between international relative prices and 
domestic relative prices in the HPAE's. Market forces 
and competitive pressures guided resources into 
activities that were consistent with comparative 
advantage ...". (Page 325). 
 
In other words, the final policy conclusion is still to reassert 
the 'market friendly' strategy of development - developing 
countries are recommended to seek their comparative advantage, 
to 'get their prices right' and to have free markets as far as 
possible. 
 
3. THE TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY(TFP) APPROACH TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
The theoretical foundation of the World Bank analyses is the TFP 
approach to economic growth. It is suggested that inter-country 
and inter-temporal variations in growth rates are caused by 
variations in total factor productivity of capital and labour. 
 Changes in the latter variable are thought to be determined mainly 
by economic policy - the degree of openness of an economy, the 
extent of competition in the product and factor markets, and 
investment in physical and human capital (education), particularly 
the latter.  The underlying chain of causation is that competition 
and education promote technical progress, and therefore TFP growth 
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and hence economic expansion.  "Free mobility of people, capital, 
and technology" and "free entry and exit of firms" are regarded 
as being particularly conducive to the spread of knowledge and 
technical change.  
 
Now at a theoretical level, there are several well-known objections 
to the causal model underlying the TFP approach to economic growth. 
The model assumes for example full employment of resources and 
perfect competition, none of which obtain in the real world.  
Moreover, it is a wholly supply-side model which ignores altogether 
the role of demand factors.
iii
 The latter, as we shall see below, 
is a critical weakness which creates serious difficulties for the 
Bank's analyses of the East Asian as well as other economies. 
 
With respect to  empirical evidence, even a cursory consideration 
of the data presented by Bank economists themselves in the 1991 
Report (table 2.2 on page 43) reveals the serious limitations of 
the TFP approach. The table provides figures for the growth of 
GDP, capital and labour inputs and TFP, separately for each of 
the sub-periods, 1960-73 and 1973-87, for each of the five 
developing regions as well as for a group of 68 developing 
economies; in addition, it also provides similar information for 
each of the four leading industrial economies. These data show 
that in every region, and for each country or group of countries 
shown in the table except South Asia (ie. in nine out of ten 
observations), the rate of growth of TFP fell substantially during 
1973-87, compared with 1960-73. For example, TFP growth fell in 
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East Asian developing economies from 2.6 percent p.a. in the first 
period to 1.3 percent p.a. in the second period; in Latin America, 
the corresponding figures were 1.3 percent p.a. and -0.4 percent 
p.a.; for the group of 68 developing economies, the TFP growth 
fell from 1.3 percent to -0.2 percent over the two periods. However, 
in South Asia - notably the only region which registered a trend 
increase in its GDP growth between the two periods - TFP growth 
rose from zero in 1960-73 to 1.2 percent p.a. during 1973-87.  
 
In terms of the causal model underlying the World Bank analysis, 
 this almost universal fall in TFP growth in the recent period 
would be due to policy mismanagement - low rates of technical 
progress caused by distortions, lack of competition, lack of 
integration with the world economy, etc.  The evidence, however, 
is not compatible with such an analysis, since as Bank economists 
themselves note there has actually been more competition, greater 
integration of the world economy, less distortions in most 
developing countries in the latter period (particularly in the 
1980s) than in the former. 
 
These facts are much more in accord with an alternative theoretical 
model which would suggest that the fall in the world and the 
national economic growth rates in the post-1973 period was 
responsible for the decline in the rate of growth of productivity 
in most regions (Verdoorn's Law).
iv
  The decline in world economic 
growth after 1973, in terms of this model, was due to a lower rate 
of growth of world and national demand caused by a whole range 
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of factors (e.g. the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the 
growth of real wages in a number of industrial countries 
outstripping productivity growth in the wake of the first oil 
shock) connected with the fall of the Golden Age of development 
of the OECD economies.
v
 
 
 
4. EFFICACY OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
The TFP approach is prominently used in the World Bank economists 
critique of the industrial policy thesis of the revisionist 
economists. One of their most controversial findings is what may 
be called, by analogy to Lucas's well known theorem
vi
, the 
industrial policy ineffectiveness doctrine. Bank economists 
assert that contrary to popular perceptions, rigorous quantitative 
analysis shows that these policies were largely ineffective in 
the East Asian countries. The clear implication is that if 
industrial policies could not succeed in these countries with their 
highly efficient bureaucracies, ipso facto these would be 
inappropriate for the rest of the developing world which is not 
blessed with such high quality administrative assets.  
 
In examining this 'ineffectiveness doctrine', there are two prior 
conceptual issues which require attention: what is industrial 
policy?; how should the "success" or otherwise of such a policy 
be assessed? 
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(a) What is Industrial Policy? 
 
Governments in almost all market economy countries intervene to 
a greater or a smaller degree in the operation of their industries. 
For example, even the US government, normally regarded as 
non-interventionist, in fact, intervenes in industry through a 
variety of measures, such as anti-trust laws, industrial 
standards, pollution regulations, labour laws. However, most 
people would agree that despite such extensive interventions, the 
US does not have an 'industrial policy', while Japan and East Asian 
countries do.  
 
What makes Japanese interventions into an 'industrial policy' is 
that in Japan, such interventions are generally coordinated and 
viewed as a coherent whole, and the government has a strategic 
view of the country's industrial development in relation to the 
world economy.  In this sense South Korea, and other East Asian 
countries also have an industrial policy.  Japan's strategic view 
in the 1950s and 60s was eloquently expressed by Vice Minister 
Ojimi of MITI as follows:  
 
The MITI decided to establish in Japan industries which require 
intensive employment of capital and technology, industries 
that in consideration of comparative cost of production 
should be the most inappropriate for Japan, industries such 
as steel, oil-refining, petro-chemicals, automobiles, 
aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and electronics, 
including electronic computers.  From a short-run, static 
viewpoint, encouragement of such industries would seem to 
conflict with economic rationalism.  But, from a long-range 
viewpoint, these are precisely the industries where income 
elasticity of demand is high, technological progress is 
rapid, and labour productivity rises fast. [OECD, 1972].   
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At the end of World War II, the bulk of Japanese exports consisted 
of textiles and light manufactured goods.  In the view of Ojimi 
and his colleagues at MITI although such an economic structure 
may have conformed to the theory of comparative advantage (Japan 
being a labour-surplus economy at the time), it was not capable 
of raising in the long run the Japanese standard of living to 
European or American levels. One interpretation of Ojimi's 
argument above would be that the purpose of the Japanese industrial 
policy was no more than to pursue the country's dynamic comparative 
advantage, but to do that as quickly as possible. The other 
non-neoclassical interpretation, which does not necessarily 
exclude the previous one, is that the purpose of the industrial 
policy was to guide the market, to deliberately create a 
competitive advantage in areas where world demand was likely to 
rise rapidly and in which it would, therefore, be in Japan's long 
term interest to specialise. As Magziner and Hout (1980) note: 
"On balance, Japan's industrial policy has been anticipating 
rather than reacting to international competitive evolution".  
  
 
Support for the non-neoclassical interpretation is provided by 
the fact that although in the 1950s and 1960s, MITI's structural 
programme could be justified in orthodox terms by the infant 
industry argument, these structural policies have continued, 
albeit in an attenuated form, right up to the present day.  MITI 
continues to provide blueprints and to seek wide business and 
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social agreement towards its future structural visions for the 
evolution of the Japanese economy, as the world competitive 
situation and Japan's role in the world economy changes.
vii
 
 
(b) Assessment of Industrial Policy 
 
How does one assess the success of an industrial policy like that 
of Japan? It is not a straightforward question since one needs 
a credible counter-factual - what would have happened in the 
absence of industrial policy?  Would Japanese industrial 
production still have grown by nearly 13 percent a year between 
1953 to 1973, its GNP by nearly 10 percent and its share in  world 
exports of manufactures change by a huge 10 percentage points? 
Boltho(1985a). 
 
One way to answer this kind of question in the absence of a 
controlled experiment would be to compare the performance of 
countries which were in other relevant ways similar to Japan, but 
which did not have an industrial policy like that of Japan. This 
after all is the broad methodology underlying the 1991 Report which 
compares the experiences of different countries to find out why 
some were successful and others were not. A closer analogy would 
be the studies which assess the success of the Bank's structural 
adjustment program by comparing countries which did have such 
programmes with those which did not. There are of course well 
recognised problems with such comparisons: to be able to provide 
satisfactory evidence on the issue the two groups of countries 
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should be as similar as possible in all other ways.  
 
Similarly, a second way of assessing the success of Japanese 
industrial policy would be to compare the country's  post-war 
economic record under an industrial policy, with its own 
performance in the pre-war period when it was not pursuing such 
policies. A third method of assessment would be to examine the 
policy  in terms of the goals which the country may have set for 
itself. In the Japanese case, during the high growth period 
1950-73, a critical proximate goal of MITI's was to ensure a current 
account balance at as high a growth rate as possible. In other 
words, the balance of payments was seen as the main constraint 
on fast economic growth in this period. (Shinhara,1982; 
Tsuru,1993). The government pursued this objective by a wide range 
of measures including inter alia a policy of extensive import 
controls, together with the promotion of exports of certain key 
industries, which changed over time.  
 
Boltho (1985a, 1985b) assesses the Japanese industrial policy on 
these criteria and concludes that the policy was successful. 
Boltho's analysis is complemented by Magziner and Hout's (1980) 
detailed and careful evidence based on case studies of several 
specific industries. These strongly suggest that the industrial 
policies were successful in propelling the targeted industries 
into pre-eminence in international competition. So how do World 
Bank economists conclude that industrial policy in countries like 
Japan or South Korea was ineffective?  
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5. THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY INEFFECTIVENESS DOCTRINE 
 
The first reason for this negative assessment is that Bank 
economists have a very narrow definition of industrial policy, 
considering it only as a policy to upgrade industrial structure.
viii
 
 Industrial policy is not viewed as a whole in all its various 
aspects. They also depart, without adequate justification, from 
the standard methodology above for assessing the effectiveness 
of industrial policy. Instead, they adopt a so-called functional 
approach to examine three types of government interventions: (a) 
directed credit, (b) export promotion, and (c) structural policy, 
and conclude that whereas (a) and (b) were successful, (c) was 
not.  
 
However, these policies cannot properly be judged individually 
since (a) and (b), as well as other policies such as extensive 
import protection for the whole economy (and not just the favoured 
sectors), were closely connected with (c). All three, combined 
with other relevant policies should therefore be assessed 
together. To recall the analogy with the Bank's own structural 
adjustment programs, the Bank's procedure in the present case 
amounts to an assessment of a single component of the structural 
adjustment programs such as say devaluation, without reference 
to the interconnections with the rest of the program. This is not 
to say that it is not an interesting and a legitimate exercise 
to consider the effectiveness of a single component of a structural 
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adjustment program or of industrial policy. However, to do that 
its links with the other components must be explicitly recognised. 
It also requires a much more elaborate counter-factual exercise 
e.g. simulation of a macro-econometric model, first with the 
structural adjustment programme, and then with one in which the 
component under reference is not considered.  
 
However, Bank economists have not carried out such research. The 
interconnections between different aspects of industrial policy 
in countries like Japan or Korea have either not been examined 
at all or as shown below, not correctly interpreted. Nevertheless, 
within their own terms, the Bank's industrial policy 
ineffectiveness doctrine rests on two empirical propositions: (a) 
That the industrial structure which emerged in industrial policy 
economies like Japan and South Korea was not all that different 
from what it would have been had these countries not pursued an 
industrial policy(ie. that the observed industrial structure was 
ex-post market conforming and accorded with the changing relative 
factor intensities and prices). (b) That the TFP growth of the 
industrial policy favoured sectors was no different from that of 
the unfavoured sectors. 
  
As tests of the ineffectiveness of industrial policy, even in this 
narrow sense, (a) and (b) are inadequate. To illustrate, suppose 
we take the neoclassical interpretation of Vice-Minister Ojimi's 
rationale for Japan's industrial policy noted earlier. On this 
interpretation, all that MITI was doing was pursuing Japan's 
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dynamic comparative advantage, helping create an industrial 
structure to accord with it. However, it was attempting to do so 
in as short a time as possible. The resulting industrial structure 
would of course in equilibrium be market conforming. So that even 
if it were true that the market forces, left to themselves, may 
have generated the same kind of industrial structure, it may have 
taken a much longer time to do so and hence resulted in a much 
lower rate of economic growth. Bank economists do not address this 
crucial issue of the speed of adjustment at all. 
  
The problem with test (b) is that it overlooks the effects of 
industrial policy on a country's balance of payments and its long 
term rate of growth of domestic demand. By confining their 
attention only to the supply side effects of productivity growth 
and technical change, as predicated by the TFP approach, Bank 
economists hypothesise that 'spillovers' of these activities will 
be confined only to the favoured sectors or their close sub-sectors 
within the two digit industrial classification which they have 
analysed. However, to the extent that industrial policy helps to 
relieve the balance of payments constraint, most sectors will 
benefit from higher rates of growth of production and hence 
productivity (by Verdoorn's Law) and not just the favoured sectors. 
In other words, the spillovers will be almost universal.  
 
Thus test (b) cannot discriminate between industrial policy and 
non-industrial policy states. To do that, one needs to look also 
at the costs and benefits of industrial policy interventions in 
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terms of their relaxing the balance of payments constraint in the 
short and the long run. More specifically, it would require inter 
alia, an examination of the contribution of the favoured sectors 
to the growth of exports or to the reduction in the growth of imports 
over time.  
 
It is the failure to consider such factors which leads  Bank 
economists to conclude that South Korea's Heavy and Chemical 
industry (HCI) drive in the 1970s was unsuccessful, while 
revisionist economists suggest that it was a success. The reason 
for these conflicting judgements is that Bank economists do not 
consider its benefits to the long term trajectory of the balance 
of payments and hence to overall economic growth. Amsden(1989) 
points out that the mainstay of Korea's celebrated export success 
in the 1980s was precisely these HCI industries.
ix
 
  
Parenthetically, a related point which is relevant here is that 
Bank economists ignore the fact that in Korea the industrial policy 
favoured sectors were not just the high capital intensity sectors 
but importantly these included textiles (precisely because of its 
contribution to the balance of payments) for most of the period. 
(see Chang, forthcoming). However, the Korean government knew, 
as did the Japanese before them, that howsoever successful a 
country may be in the export of textiles, to have sustained fast 
overall rates of growth of exports over time, it needs to regularly 
add new export products to the list. Hence the need to continuously 
upgrade the industrial and export structure of the economy, albeit, 
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if it pleases the Bank, in accordance with the country's changing 
dynamic comparative advantage. However, it will be appreciated 
that the factor proportions Hekscher-Ohlin theory does not yield 
any precise predictions where a country's dynamic comparative 
advantage lies as it accumulates capital and skills. The theory 
predicts a movement towards skill intensive exports but does not 
specify which ones. In Japan and Korea, the government selected 
and nurtured those industries where it thought the country did, 
or should (in the non-neoclassical interpretation) have a dynamic 
comparative advantage.  
 
Bank economists seem to be unaware of an ironic implication of 
their analysis. If despite heavy government intervention, the 
Japanese and the Korean industrial structures still conformed to 
these countries' dynamic comparative advantage, a reasonable 
inference must be that on average the government was correctly 
able to 'pick the winners'! Hence, at this level of analysis, in 
Bank economists own terms, the Japanese or the Korean industrial 
policies should be regarded as a success.  
 
To sum up, the above discussion indicates that Bank economists 
arrive at their industrial policy ineffectiveness doctrine by (a) 
considering industrial policy in a very narrow sense; (b) by 
ignoring its multi-faceted character and the important linkages 
between its different components; and (c) even within their own 
terms by using inappropriate tests for assessing the success or 
otherwise of industrial policy. The first of their tests is not 
 
 
 20 
valid because it does not consider the critical issue of the speed 
of adjustment to a country's dynamic comparative advantage; the 
second is marred by the fact that it abstracts from the effects 
of industrial policy on the balance of payments constraint and 
hence on overall demand - issues which are salient in the real 
world of imperfect or incomplete markets in semi-industrial 
economies. The TFP model, with its assumptions of full utilisation 
of resources and perfect competition, which Bank economists use 
is inappropriate for such analysis.      
 
6. OPENNESS: 'CLOSE' VERSUS 'STRATEGIC' INTEGRATION WITH THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
(a) Degrees of Openness of the East Asian Economies 
 
The virtues of openness, international competition, close 
integration with the world economy, are stressed in several Bank 
publications (see in particular the 1991 Report). Evidence 
suggests, however, that these virtues were not in fact practised 
by either Japan or Korea. 
 
To illustrate, the Japanese economy operated under rigorous import 
controls, whether formal or informal, throughout the 1950s and 
1960s.  As late as 1978, the total imports  of manufactured goods 
into Japan was only 2.4 percent of GDP. The corresponding figures 
for manufactured imports for the UK and other leading European 
countries were at that time of the order of 14 or 15 per cent of 
GDP. Between 1950 and 1970, the Japanese domestic capital markets 
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were highly regulated and completely shut off from the world 
capital markets. Only the government and its agencies were able 
to borrow from or lend abroad.  Foreign direct investment was 
strictly controlled.  Foreign firms were prohibited either by 
legal or administrative means from acquiring a majority ownership 
in Japanese corporations. 
 
With respect to the questions of exchange rates and distortions, 
the Japanese Government maintained exchange controls and kept a 
steady nominal exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar over 
almost the whole of the period of that country's most rapid growth 
(1950-73).  Purchasing power parity calculations by Sachs (1987), 
using Japanese and U.S. price indices, show a 60 percent real 
appreciation of the exchange rate between 1950 and 1970. 
 
Thus, despite the strong export orientation of the Japanese 
economy, it was far from being open or closely integrated with 
the world economy. The stories of Taiwan and South Korea, subject 
to certain modifications, also point in the same general 
direction.[see further Amsden(1989) and Wade(1990)]. 
 
(b) Protection and Export Promotion: Alternative Interpretations 
 
What was the role of this high degree of protection in the East 
Asian economies? The Bank economists acknowledge the facts of this 
protective regime but essentially argue that this was generally 
a negative influence which was kept in bounds only by the government 
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pursuit of export targets and export contests.  
 
This interpretation has serious short-comings. First, as noted 
earlier, generalised protection was one of the mechanisms used 
by the Japanese and the Korean governments to alleviate the balance 
of payments constraint. Secondly, and equally significantly, there 
are both analytical and empirical reasons for the view that 
protection played an important, positive role in promoting 
technical change, productivity growth and exports in these 
countries. To appreciate how protection worked at a microeconomic 
level, consider the specific case of the celebrated Japanese car 
industry.  Magaziner and Hout (1980) point out that "government 
intervention in this industry was characterized by three major 
goals:  discouragement of foreign capital in the Japanese industry 
and protection against car imports, attempts to bring about 
rationalization of production, and assistance with overseas 
marketing and distribution expenditure" (p. 55). The government 
imposed comprehensive import controls and adopted a variety of 
measures to discourage foreign investment in the car industry.(see 
also below).  Quotas and tariffs were used to protect the industry; 
the former were applied throughout the mid-1960s, and 
prohibitively high tariffs till the mid-1970s.  Moreover, "the 
government controlled all foreign licensing agreements.  To make 
technology agreements more attractive to the licensor, it 
guaranteed the remittance of royalties from Japan.  The policy 
stipulated, however, that continued remittances would be 
guaranteed only if 90 percent of the licensed parts were produced 
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in Japan within five years" - about as powerful a domestic content 
arrangement as one can get. 
 
More generally, protection provided the Japanese companies with 
a captive home market leading to high profits which enabled the 
firms to undertake higher rates of investment, to learn by doing 
and to improve the quality of their products.  These profits in 
the protected internal market, which were further enhanced by  
restrictions on domestic competition (see Section VII), not only 
made possible higher rates of investment but also greatly aided 
exports.  Yamamura (1988) shows how these protective policies gave 
the Japanese firm 'a strategic as well as a cost advantage' over 
foreign competitors. In other words protection, export promotion 
and performance standards were very much complementary policies. 
 
(i) Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
An important feature of both the Japanese and the Korean industrial 
policy has been the discouragement of foreign direct 
investment(FDI). Available statistics indicate that among 
developing countries, Korea was second only to India in its low 
reliance on FDI inflows.  Foreign capital stocks totalled just 
2.3 per cent of GNP in 1987 in Korea, above the 0.5 per cent estimate 
for India, but far below the levels of 5.3 per cent for Taiwan, 
17 per cent for Hong Kong, a massive 87 per cent for Singapore, 
10 per cent for Brazil and 14 per cent for Mexico. UN (1993). In 
the view of the World Bank economists, this discouragement was 
a self-imposed handicap which was compensated for only by the fact 
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that both countries remained open to foreign technology through 
licensing and other means. This raises the question that if the 
Japanese and the Korean governments were as efficient and flexible 
in their economic policy as the Bank economists themselves suggest 
(to account for their long term overall economic success), how 
is it they have persisted with this apparently wrong-headed 
approach for so long?  
 
An alternative interpretation is that the approach was perhaps 
not so wrong-headed. It was 'functional' within the context of 
the overall industrial policies which the two countries were 
pursuing. First, it would have been difficult for MITI or for the 
Korean authorities to use 'administrative guidance' to the same 
degree with the foreign firms as they were able to do with the 
domestic ones.  Secondly, as UN(1993) emphasises, there is a link 
between the national ownership of the large Korean firms (Chaebols) 
and their levels of investment in research and development. Korea 
has, in relative terms, by far the largest expenditure on R and 
D among developing countries:  1.9 percent of GNP in 1988, compared 
with 1.2 percent in Taiwan (1988), 0.9 percent for India (1986) 
and Singapore (1987), 0.5 percent for Argentina (1988), 0.6 percent 
in Mexico (1984) and 0.4 percent in Brazil (1985).  The country's 
performance in this area outstrips that of many developed countries 
(eg. Belgium, 1.7 per cent in 1987), but is of course still below 
that of industrial super powers, (Japan and Germany each at 2.8 
percent in 1987). 
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Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stresses another important advantage of 
the policy of mainly rejecting foreign investment as a means of 
technology transfer. This, he argues, automatically places on the 
enterprise, the full responsibility for assimilating imported 
technology. This is far more likely to lead to "total system 
improvements than the 'turn-key plant' mode of import or the 
foreign subsidiary mode". 
   
(ii) Price Distortions 
 
Bank economists in their econometric analyses in recent 
publications use a quantitative measure of openness - the degree 
to which the relative domestic prices in an economy differ from 
international relative prices. On that measure, it turns out that 
both Japan and Korea were among the least open economies. Relative 
prices in these countries were more distorted than in  Brazil, 
India, Mexico, Pakistan and Venezuela, often held up by the Bretton 
Woods institutions as prime examples of countries which do not 
'get the prices right'. 
 
(c) The Optimal Degree of Openness and Strategic Integration with 
the World Economy 
 
To sum up, the experience of Japan and Korea comprehensively 
contradicts the central theses of many World Bank Reports that, 
the more open the economy, the closer its integration with the 
global economy, the faster would be its rate of growth. During 
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their periods of rapid growth, instead of a deep or unconditional 
integration with the world economy, these countries evidently 
sought what might be called 'strategic' integration, i.e. they 
integrated upto the point that it was in their interest to do so 
as to promote national economic growth.  If (as stated in the 1991 
Report) the purpose of  Bank economists was to find out why 
countries like Japan have been so successful in economic 
development during the last forty years, they have clearly been 
using the wrong paradigm for examining Japanese economic history. 
 The basic problem is that the underlying assumptions of this 
paradigm are greatly at variance with the real world of static 
and dynamic economies of scale, learning by doing, and imperfect 
competition.  In such a world, even neoclassical analysis now 
accepts that the optimal degree of openness for a country is not 
"close" integration with the global economy through free trade.
x
 
 In that case, what is the optimal degree of openness for the 
economy?  This extremely important policy question however is not 
seriously addressed by the orthodox theory.
xi
 
 
Chakravarty and Singh (1988) provide an alternative theoretical 
perspective for considering this issue. To put it briefly, they 
argue that "openness" is a multi-dimensional concept; apart from 
trade, a country can be "open" or not so open with respect to 
financial and capital markets, in relation to technology, science, 
culture, education, inward and outward migration.  Moreover a 
country can choose to be open in some directions [say trade] but 
not so open in others such as foreign direct investment or financial 
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markets. Their analysis suggests that there is no unique optimum 
form or degree of openness which holds true for all countries at 
all times.  A number of factors affect the desirable nature of 
openness:  the world configuration, the past history of the 
economy, its state of development, among others.  The timing and 
sequence of opening are also critical.  They point out that there 
may be serious irreversible losses if the wrong kind of openness 
is attempted or the timing and sequence are incorrect.  The East 
Asian experience of "strategic" rather than "close" integration 
with the world economy makes perfect sense within this kind of 
theoretical framework. 
Such a framework can also explain why for the second tier of South 
East Asian NICs - Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia - the optimal 
degree of openness is different than it was for the East Asian 
countries.  As noted earlier, in the South-East Asian economies, 
foreign direct investment has played a far more important role 
than it did in Japan or South Korea. As a consequence of the fast 
development of the East Asian countries, the second tier NICs are 
faced with a different historical situation. This makes it 
advantageous for them to attract industries which are no longer 
economic in the first tier countries because of the growth of their 
real wages - as suggested by the so called "flying geese" model 
of Asian economic development.  
 
It should be emphasised that this model and the associated 
intra-regional pattern of trade and investment in Asia is  itself 
in part a product of the industrial policy in Japan, Korea and 
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other countries.  Unlike many other advanced countries which try 
to protect declining industries, the Japanese practice a 
'positive' industrial policy of encouraging structural change by 
assisting the replacement of old industries by the new.  This, 
however, involves an orderly rundown of the older industries (see 
next section), including inter-alia their transfer to less 
developed countries in the region.(Okimoto, 1989) 
 
Consequently, Felix (1994) suggests that East Asian foreign direct 
investment in the region has been structurally more conducive to 
sustaining backward linkage development in the participant 
economies than has been the case of foreign direct investment in 
Latin America. He ascribes this to the fact that the East Asian 
intra-regional pattern has evolved along a dynamic comparative 
advantage path dominated by cost minimising trade and investment. 
The Latin American pattern, he suggests, has been shaped largely 
by mercantilist market access rather than by cost minimising 
objectives. As a result, it is more vulnerable to disruptive shifts 
of trading advantages deriving from changes in the marketing and 
financial strategies of foreign firms. 
 
7. COMPETITION IN THE DOMESTIC MARKETS 
 
World Bank economists have traditionally stressed the merits of 
competition in the domestic product, capital and labour markets. 
 However, the  practice of the successful East Asian countries 
in this respect also has been rather different.  As in relation 
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to the question of integration with the world economy, Japan and 
Korea appear to have taken the view that from the dynamic 
perspective of promoting investment and technical change, the 
optimal degree of competition is not perfect or maximum 
competition.  The governments in these countries have therefore 
managed or guided competition in a purposeful manner:  it has both 
been encouraged, but notably also restricted in a number of ways. 
 
(a) Collusion and Competition in Japan 
 
To illustrate, it is useful to reflect on some of the blatant 
restrictions which were imposed by the Japanese Government in the 
1950s and 1960s on domestic product market competition. To meet 
its myriad goals which continually changed in the light of economic 
circumstances facing the country, MITI encouraged a variety of 
cartel arrangements in a wide range of industries ─ export and 
import cartels, cartels to combat depression or excessive 
competition, rationalization cartels, etc.   According to Caves 
and Uekusa(1976), in the 1960s, cartels accounted for 78.1 percent 
of the value of shipments in textiles; 64.8 percent in clothing; 
50.0 percent in non-ferrous metals; 47 percent in printing and 
publishing; 41.2 percent in stone, clay and glass; 34.5 percent 
in steel products, and 37.2 percent in food products.  Although 
these cartels functioned for only limited periods of time and there 
was wide variation in their effectiveness,  Caves and Uekusa 
observed that "their mere presence in such broad stretches of the 
manufacturing sector attests to their importance." (page 147). 
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However, these restraints on competition are only a part of the 
story. An equally significant part is MITI's strong encouragement 
of vigorous domestic oligopolistic rivalry and international 
competitiveness. In general, whether competition was promoted or 
restricted depended on the industry and its life-cycle: in young 
industries, during the developmental phase, the government 
discouraged competition; when these  
industries became technologically mature, competition was allowed 
to flourish.  Later, when industries are in competitive decline, 
the government again discourages competition and, as noted 
earlier, attempts to bring about an orderly rationalization of 
the industry (Okimoto, 1989).   
 
Yamamura (1988) provides a useful dynamic model to show how the 
Japanese competition policy was an integral part of the country's 
industrial policy. During the rapid growth phase of Japanese 
development in the 1950s and 1960s, in the key industries which 
were receiving its attention, MITI  essentially organized an 
"investment race" among large oligopolistic firms in which exports 
and international market share were significant performance goals. 
 As in the real world markets are always incomplete, such a race 
without a coordinator could lead to ruinous competition, price 
wars and excess capacity, inhibiting the inducement to invest. 
 In the Japanese economic miracle, MITI provided this crucial 
coordinating role and orchestrated the dynamic combination of 
collusion and competition which characterizes Japanese industrial 
 
 
 31 
policy. Yamamura notes that what MITI did was to 'guide' the firms 
to invest in such a way that each large firm in a market expanded 
its productive capacity roughly in proportion to its current market 
share ─ no firm was to make an investment so large that it would 
destabilize the market.  The policy was effective in encouraging 
competition for the market share (thus preserving the essential 
competitiveness of the industrial markets) while reducing the risk 
of losses due to excessive investment.  Thus, it promoted the 
aggressive expansion of capacity necessary to increase productive 
efficiency. 
 
(b) Large Firms and Domestic Competition in Korea 
 
Turning to Korea, that country also did not follow a policy of 
maximum domestic competition or unfettered market-determined 
entry or exit of firms. The Korean government, if anything, went 
one step further than the Japanese in actively helping to create 
large conglomerates, promoting mergers, and directing entry and 
exit of firms according to the requirements of technological scale 
economies and world demand conditions. The result is that Korea's 
manufacturing industry displays one of the highest levels of market 
concentration anywhere. The top 50 chaebols accounted for 15 
percent of the country's GDP in 1990. Among the largest 500 
industrial companies in the world in 1990, there were eleven Korean 
firms, the same number as Switzerland. UN(1993) observes in 
relation to the Korean industrial structure:  
"Such a structure is the deliberate creation of the Government, 
which utilised a highly interventionist strategy to push 
industry into large-scale, complex technologically demanding 
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activities while simultaneously restricting FDI inflows 
tightly to promote national ownership. It was deemed 
necessary to create enterprises of large size and diversity, 
to undertake the risk inherent in launching in 
high-technology, high-skill activities that would remain 
competitive in world markets.    
 
 
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the big business groups 
still exhibited highly rivalrous behaviour (Kim, 1992). This was 
because under rapid growth conditions, as well as the rules of 
the game which the state had established, there was neither the 
incentive nor the ability for big business to collude.  The Korean 
government went out of its way to insure that big business did 
not collude, by allocating subsidies only in exchange for strict 
performance standards (Amsden, 1989).  After 1975 inter-group 
competition in Korea heated-up as each chaebol, or diversified 
business group, tried to qualify for generous subsidies to 
establish a general trading company by meeting government 
performance standards regarding minimum export volume and the 
number of export products (Cho, 1987) 
 
(c) An Assessment 
 
There has been a major advance in the Bank's thinking about the 
role of free markets and competition in economic development.  
Implicitly rejecting the view embodied in many previous documents 
and specifically in the 1991 Report that, "Competitive markets 
are the best way yet found for efficiently organising the 
production and distribution of goods and services", the Bank's 
recent seminal publication (the Miracle Study) accepts the need 
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for cooperation as well as competition to achieve fast economic 
growth. Specifically in relation to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
Bank economists acknowledge the positive role of cooperation (or 
restrictions on competition) in order to correct what they call 
"the coordination failures", which particularly characterise 
industrialising country product and capital markets.  In this 
analysis, a much larger role of the government as a referee to 
mediate these cooperative arrangements is explicitly recognised. 
  Thus, intellectually, Bank economists accept the revisionist 
argument that the governments in these East Asian countries guided 
the market and controlled the competitive process, and that this 
guidance was conducive to their fast growth.  
 
Nevertheless, after this giant conceptual step forward for the 
Bank economists, in their policy recommendations to other 
developing countries, they retreat to their earlier perspective 
of free and competitive markets.  The main argument  made for this 
reversal is that  other countries do not have the institutional 
capacity to successfully implement the required combination of 
competition and cooperation . 
 
 
8.INDUSTRIAL POLICY, NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM AND 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 
In addition to protection, domestic competition policy another 
measures already discussed above, another important component of 
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industrial policy in the exemplar East Asian countries has been 
a national strategy for technological development. The World Bank 
reports invariably stress the importance of primary and secondary 
education for achieving economic growth. However, they do not pay 
sufficient attention to tertiary education and to the 
technological infrastructure both human and physical which late 
industrialisers require to catch-up with the advanced countries. 
Yet, it is precisely in these areas that the East Asian countries 
have excelled, which in turn has played a major role in enhancing 
their international competitiveness and their outstanding export 
success.  
 
A national system of technological advancement was first advocated 
by Friedrich List in the first half of the 19th century to enable 
Germany to catch up with Great Britain. Although "catch up" was 
much easier then than it is for today's developing countries, many 
of List's insights continue to remain valid.
xii
 Following the end 
of World War II, the Japanese adopted a national technological 
system which spans the government, the firms, the universities, 
and indeed, the society as a whole. Freeman(1989) identifies 
following to be the principal elements of this national 
techno-economic strategy. 
 
a.  The ability to design and redesign entire production 
processes, whether in shipbuilding, machine tools or any other 
industry. 
b.  The capacity at national, government level to pursue an 
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integration strategy which brings together the best available 
resources from universities, government, research institutions, 
private or public industry to solve the most important design and 
development problems. 
c.  The development of an educational and training system which 
goes beyond the German level in two respects. First, in the absolute 
numbers of young people acquiring higher levels of education, 
specially in science and engineering. Second, in the scale and 
quality of industrial training which is carried out at enterprise 
level. 
d.  The policy of eschewing, as noted earlier, foreign investment 
as a principal means of technology transfer.  
e.  The emergence of a far more flexible and decentralised 
management system, permitting both greater horizontal integration 
of design, development and production and more rapid response to 
change. 
f.  Close co-operation between the central government and Keiretsu 
(large conglomerate groupings in Japanese industries) in 
identifying future technological trajectories, and taking joint 
initiatives, to adopt these to enhance the country's prospective 
competitiveness. 
 
It is notable that many Asian countries including, Korea, Taiwan 
and currently China have been consciously following the Japanese 
model and building their own national technological systems in 
the light of their resources and requirements. It is also striking 
that several of these countries now have a higher annual output 
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of graduate engineers per hundred thousand of population than 
Japan. These countries are thus trying to outdo Japan in this 
respect, just as Japan outstripped the United States. 
Freeman(1989) calls attention to the fact that the third country 
in the world to introduce and export 256K memory chips after Japan 
and USA was not an advanced industrial country but South Korea. 
It took that country less than thirty years, starting from a 
position of barely any industry at all, to become a significant 
player in the world electronics industry. 
 
None of the above is to under-estimate the formidable problems 
which the late industrialisers face just to keep in step with the 
fast pace of technological change in the world economy, let alone 
to catch up. Lall (1994) and others have pointed to the formidable 
technological and other barriers to entry
xiii
 in the world markets 
which LDC firms face. To meet these technological challenges, 
developing countries require a  continuing build-up of national 
technological capability  through an integrated system in the ways 
outlined above.  It is an incremental and long-term process 
requiring concerted national effort in which the government 
necessarily plays a leading direct, as well as a crucial 
coordinating role.  Without such effort, countries like Korea or 
Taiwan would not have been able to hold their share of world 
manufacturing exports, let alone greatly increase them as they 
have so successfully done over the last two decades or more.   
    
 
 
 
 37 
The World Bank emphasis on early education would not appear to 
be an adequate means of enhancing the international industrial 
competitiveness of semi-industrial countries. To compete in the 
world industrial economy, it is also essential to have higher 
educational institutions, scientists, technologists and 
engineers.  It is  useful in this context to go back to the earlier 
discussion of changing factor proportions and its implications 
for comparative advantage and structural changes in the economy. 
The changing factor proportions (in the sense of human capital 
and skill formation) over time in the East Asian countries, was 
clearly not simply an outcome of 'natural market forces' as per 
capita income rose. Rather these developments were very much guided 
by the visible hand of the government in terms of its national 
priorities. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
As detailed in the previous pages, there has been considerable 
progress in the debate between heterodox and World Bank economists 
concerning the outstandingly successful development experience 
of East Asian economies like Japan or Korea.  There is now general 
agreement that governments in these countries intervened heavily 
in all spheres of the economy in order to achieve rapid economic 
growth and fast industrialisation.  It is also common ground that 
during the course of their development these countries did not 
have free and flexible internal or external product and capital 
markets.  Although these countries were export oriented, they 
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eschewed close integration with the international economy in terms 
of imports,foreign direct investment or capital flows.  The 
governments of these countries also controlled and guided the 
competitive process in the domestic product and capital markets 
through a highly effective combination of inter-firm cooperation 
and oligopolistic competition. 
 
There are, of course, still important areas of disagreement - 
particularly in relation to the industrial policy ineffectiveness 
doctrine of the World Bank economists.  Nevertheless, on the 
whole, there is now much less disagreement on the analytical and 
empirical issues than on policy.  A main reason for the policy 
differences is the belief of Bank economists that other countries 
do not have the institutional capacity to implement the optimum 
degree of competition and openness which the exemplar East Asian 
countries achieved.  How valid is this view? 
 
The important point to note here is that the Japanese model was 
itself imitated by the Koreans and by the Taiwanese.  When Korea 
 decided to embark on the Japanese model in the 1960s, as World 
Bank economists themselves admit, that country did not have the 
necessary institutional capacity. The Korean bureaucracy at the 
time was incompetent and corrupt, as indeed was the case with the 
Kuomintang bureaucracy when it arrived in Taiwan from mainland 
China.  Yet these countries were able to create the right kind 
of bureaucracy and the other necessary institutions required for 
implementing the Japanese model. If these institutions can be 
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created by Korea and Taiwan, and later on by Malaysia or Indonesia, 
surely it must be possible to establish them in many other countries 
elsewhere as well?  In the end therefore, this analysis raises 
the following question: if in view of the ubiquitous coordination 
failures in the less developed economies, state- directed 
industrialisation on the Japanese or Korean pattern is the first 
best policy for achieving fast economic growth, should the World 
Bank not concern itself more with the institutional imitation and 
innovation of the kind outlined above, than with prescribing 
market-friendliness or close integration with the world economy 
(which these countries did not practice)? 
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i. The World Bank's annual World Development Reports are useful sources for the analysis 
of these issues. However, for reasons given in section  II, the two most important 
documents in this context are World Bank (1991, 1993). The latter are seminal works 
which provide a comprehensive account of  Bank economists' thinking on these and other 
development problems and their conclusions on public policy.  These are therefore the 
specific documents this paper draws upon in all references made to the Bank's analyses. 
ii. See the commentaries in this Journal by Amsden et al (1994) on World Bank (1993).  
iii.There is an enormous literature on the subject.  For a lucid analysis of the relevant 
issues under discussion here, see Nelson [1981]. 
iv.The classic references here are Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor (1966). For a review, 
see Mcombie (1987). The TFP growth table in the 1991 Report shows that in general, 
the larger the fall in the growth of output (in 1973-87 compared with the earlier period), 
the greater the reduction in TFP growth, much as would be predicted by Verdoorn's Law. 
Moreover, the South Asian region is the only one to record an increase in TFP growth 
in the second period; it is also the only one with a substantial trend increase in 
GDP growth in that period.  
v. The period 1950-73, when the OECD economy grew at an unprecedented rate of almost 
5% per annum─twice its historic trend rate of growth─has rightly been termed the Golden 
Age of capitalism. Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh, (1990) provide a detailed analysis 
of why the Golden Age rose in the first place and why it fell following the 1973 oil 
shock.  See also Maddison [1982]; Bruno and Sachs [1985]; Kindleberger [1992]. To avoid 
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misunderstanding, it must be emphasised that we are not considering here the question 
of short term demand management, but rather that of the forces which affect the long 
term rate of growth of demand.  
vi. See for example Lucas (1973). 
vii. See further Johnson, Tyson and Zysman (1989). There have been important changes 
in the 1970s and the 1980s in the nature and conduct of MITI's industrial policies, 
compared with the 1950s and the 1960s. In general, MITI does not now have the same 
kind of coercive policy instruments as it did in the high growth period. It therefore 
has to use more indirect instruments as well as moral persuasion to a far larger degree 
than it did before.  
viii. Thus the Miracle Study: "We define industrial policies, as distinct from trade 
policies, as government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote 
productivity-based growth." (p.304). 
ix. The question of the time horizon over which the costs and benefits of industrial 
policy interventions are assessed is of crucial importance. Amsden and Singh(1994) 
point out that for thirty years there were few foreign cars to be seen on Korean roads 
and few Korean cars to be seen on foreign roads. In other words, the Korean government 
provided protection to the car industry for long periods of time because of the 
difficulties involved in the learning and the assimilation of foreign technology in 
developing countries. 
x.See for example Krugman (1987) and Roderick (1992). 
xi.On this point, see the interesting review by Lucas (1990) of Helpman & Krugman (1989). 
xii. See further Freeman(1989) 
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xiii. see also Box 3.3 on Samsung industries on page 130 which confirms these points. 
